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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
SPRINGVlljlJE BANKING

·CO:M~

PANY, a corporation 1
Plaint~ff

and Appellant,

-vs.-

C. TAYLOR B1JRTON, ERNEST H.
BALCif, 'VESTON .l~~. HAlfiLTON,
FRANCIS FELTCH and W. J.
S~IIRL~ individually and as members
of the UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
Defendants and Respo-ndents.

Case No.

9066

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about February 4, 1959, complaint in the above
entitled matter 'vas filed and personal service made the
following day upon t\\•o of the defendants, C. Taylor
Burton and ll'l e~ton E. HaJniJton~ In said complaint
plaintiff alleges ownershjp and possession of a lot and
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building located on the northeast corner of 7th South
and h:lain Streets in Springville, ·utah County, lT tah, and
that in about April and May, 1958, defendants constructed con ere te strips or it5lands within the boundaries
of Main Street in ~uch a n1anner as to jmperle ingress
and egress to and from plaintiff's property, and that
planitiff's property has been greatly depreciated thereby~
Plaintiff adnrit~ that said strips or islands were oonstruct.~d for t.bc use of the publie in a skillful and proper
manner, hut further alleges that by such construction
the defendants have damaged plaintiff's property "rithln
the meaning of Article I, Section 22 J 1~ tab (;onstitution.
Plaintiff therefore ask~ the ·Court for a declaration
pursua11t to Title 78, Chapter 33, L".C.A. 1953, that for
su~ll damages t.hP- plaintiff iR entitled to eompensation
and further, for an order purHua.nt to Rule 65 (b) (3), of
tlte 1Jtah R-ule~ of Civil Procedure, eornpelling the defendant6 to in it.lat.e an action against the plaintiff in
areordance \vith the provisions of Title 78~ Chapter 34~
l,..~C ......:\.. 1953, for the purp-ose of ascertaining and a~~essing the mnount. of datnagcH~ {See Coln}llaint, R. 1)
L

The defendants, hy and through the _A ttorrlf!.Y (}en·eral or the State of Utah, aR provided in Sert.ion ~7 -2-1:~,
U.C ..t\_. 1953, moved to dismiss the complaint as follo'v~:
(R. 4).
''(~ome no\v the defendants b:v and thruugh
t.h~ Attorney General of the State of lTtah, as
provided in Section 27-2-13, 1Jtah Code Annotated
1953, and move the court aR follov,~s :
1. To dismiss the action or. in lieu thereof,
to quash the returns of service of summons on
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the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject ntatt.e r·, or if the court finds it does have
jurisdir.tjon over the subject matter,

24 To dismiss the action for:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the per son R
of defendants, and
(b) failure to state a claim against defendants upon 'vhich relief can be granted."

On April2-2,. 1959, thP. IIonorable Ste,vart M. Hanson,
Judge, District Court. of Salt Lake County, after oral
argument and the presentat.ion of briefs hy the respective
partie~, disn1issed plaintiff'f.; action. Plaintiff no-\v appeals from said dismissaL
For the purpose of cJarifiration and to assist the
Court in visuaJiz·ing U1e situation involved, "\Ve enclose
and attach hereto as itppenrllx A a schematie dra~ring.,
prepared hy the Utah Itoarl Commi~sion, of the area
involved in plain tiff's con1plaint. For purpose of identification the area f.;hn\vn in yello\v is 7th South Street; the
area sh ov.'ll in bro'vn rna r ked ''L '' line is Main Street ;
the area sl10Vt11 in brovm marked ''F~' line is the north
bound lanes of l'". SL High\va~l 89-91; the area sho\vn in
red is the frame store allegedly belonging to the plaintiff;
the areaf.; sho,vn in green are the median strips, or as
designated in the complaint, conerete islands, claimed to
inter£ere 1vith ingress and egress to plaintiff's frame
~tore. Y 011 'vill note that l\fain Street is no'v de signa ted
as a one-v,cay street Vt'ith traffic flo,ving north1vard. 7th
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South remains a two-way street~ U. S. Ilighway 89-91
is divided as to south-bound and north-bound traffic
by the median strips shown~
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT L

UNDER THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFJS
COMPLAINT THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS INDIVIDUALLY OR AS ME?vlBERS OF THE UTAH
STATE ROAD COMMISSION.

POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANTS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRA.NTED.

ARGTJMENT
POINT I+

UNDER THE FACTS AS ALLEGED IN PLAINTIFFtS
C011PLAINT THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANTS INDIVIDUALLY OR AS MEJ\'IBERS OF THE UTAH
STATE ROAD COMMISSION~

S eeti on 27 -2-1~ {T. C~A- 1953, as arnended, reads in
part as follows:

''* * • By its name the commission tnay sue,
and it may be sued only on 'Nl"itten contracts made
by it or under its authority. • * •"
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In the case of Campbell Building Company v. State
Road Commission, 1937, 95 Utah 242~ 70 P.2d 857, tlris
Court held that tlte State Road Con1mission is an arm
or agency of the state and that~ therefore, the State
Road ·Commission cannot be sued by nature of sovereign
irnmunity unless the state, through legislative or constitutional action 7 has given its consent. This Court then
~tat.es that the consent by the state to be ~ued on certain
contracts of the Road Commission does not open the
door to liability on -acconn t of the negligence or nlisconduct or wilful conduct or unauthorized acts of officers
or agents of the state.
In the case of Stale v. JJistrict Cou-rt, l!'ou.·rth Judicial
IJ.istrict, 1937 ~ 94 lJtah 384, 78 P.2d 849, th.is Court held
that an injunction suit to rrestrain the St.ate Iioad Commission fron1 constructing a viaduct along a portion of a
street could not be nlaintaincd since such suit "\Va~ one
against the state and there was no consent to be sued or
waiver of state's irnmunity fro1n suit.

We submit, therefore, that the Di.stnct Court of
Salt Lake County has no jurisdiction over the defendants
af.; mernbers of the State lloarl Commi~sion nnder the
faets aUeged in plaintiff's complaint. From page 25 of
the brief of appellant in tl1 is appeal, we asr.;ume there
is no argument on this point.
As to the jurisdiction of the District Court over the
individual members of the State Road Commir.;sion~ we
cite the case of R jortlt, et al. 11. Wki"ttenhurg ~ et al., 1952,
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241 P. 2d 907, 121 {i tah 324, ¥lhe rein this Court stated

that:
'• \Ve hold that where consequential injury to
property arise8 out of the faithful and honest
perforrnance of duties imposed hy laVJt· upon menlbers o.f the l~oad Cormnis sion, such officialR are

not required to respond
p~

personally~''

(241

P.2d~

909)

I~,aced ""~it.h

the decision of "\vhat \Ve shall hereafter
refer to as the Fourth District case (Atate v. District
Court, Fourth J11djcial District, supra), i.e~~ that the

Road Commission ca.n not be enjoined ["rorn eonsc~ {uenti.al damage~ and the decision of the llj orth case
( Hjorth, et at V~ VThittenburg, supra), i~e~, that the
individual members of the ·Road Cornrni.H~ion Inay not
be sued for consequential damages, the plaintiff now
attempts to accon1plish the end denied in both the Fourth
District r..ase an rl the Hj o rtl1 case by t} ~e skillful use of
the procedural device of n1andamus.
Tn our opinion the proper conclusion in this matter
is predic.ated u·pon a c.orrect undert5tancling and reconciliation of the 1 ourth District and Hj o rth ca 8es~ In the
Fourth District case, the action v~ras fjled to enjoin the
State Road Connnission from proceeding 'v ith c.c rtai n
street improv·e-rncnts 'vhicl1 "'ould result in consequential
damage to the plaintiff~ As in the instant matter~ there
was no allegation of a taking, only that of a prospective
darnage. ~rhe plaintiff in the Fourth D·istrict case argued
that an injunction suit aginst the State Road Conunission
4
,
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..

was not a suit against the State of l!talL The Court
replied.
~ ~"\\i e CBJlnot agree 'vith this argrnn en t. insofar
as the Road Commission as such is concerned4
It is an agency of the state and a suit against
it is a suit against the state." (78 P.2d~ p. 504)4
Then by "ray of dicta, the Court volunteered that '~.
if
the inilividual members of the R-oad Corruni.ssion are personally made parties defendant in the injunction suit~ the
case ,vj}l be different than if prosecuted against the Road
Comnrission R8 a body.~' (78 P.2d pg. 505). rrh1s dicta
to the effect that the individual members of the ltoad
Cotnnrission could be enjoined from a consequential
damage ~ias argued by the plaintiff in the Hjorth ease
as anU1ority for the proposition that the individual
me1nbers of the Road ·Commission could be sued for
consequential dan1ages. In revie,ving tlte finding8 of the
trial court, this Court stated in the Hjorth eaHe as
r

•

follows~

''The trial court relied to a -considerable
extent upon the case State by State Road Commission v. Distriet Court, Fourth i>Judirial District ~ ~ -a; which ·Involved an injunction against
individual Incn1bers of the R-oad Conlillission and
sOine of the language therein which seen1s to indi~
eate that the commissioners rnay be sued inruvidu~
ally for damages. We think~ however, that this
dicta is not the true rule for reasonR which will
hereinafter appearL In. fact, the dis~enting opinion
of :Mr4 Chief ~Justice Wolfe foreshadows and
suggests the holding in thi~ ease.'' (241 P . 2d 908).
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We could do nothing better in u:rging our position
in the present matter than to quote verbatim the dissen~
ing argument of tlustice \Volfe in the Fourth District
case. For brevity, however:t we refer only to the following
points argued by Chief Justice 'lfolfe and refer the
Court to the authorities eited by him.
(1) There is a fundamental difference in the ''taking'' by a state agency and a damage consequent on the
perfDrmance of the duty which does not involve a taking.
(78 P.2d, p. 512).
(2) If the Road Commissioners are acting within
their authority, then even a suit against them individually
as defendant~ is a sujt against the 8tate. (78 P.2d, p.
512). It is fundamental that 1vhere those in charge of
an agency representing the s·tate are sued in their individual capacities, it is in effect a suit against the state
if the act or aut1lority under which the)~ act is constitutional, and they are acting withln that authority. The
members of the State Road Commission, when acting
witllln their authority in making changes in the high\vay
for the safet. y of the publj c, cannot be coerced or delayed
by injunction into bringing a condemnation snit to have
such damages appraised. (78 P . 2d, p. 517 and 519).,

( 3) The in elusion of the word '' dama.ged '' in Section
22, Article I, T~tah Constitution, \vas intended to give a
substantive right not theretofore enjoyed and did n.ot
contemplate the matter of remedy.. ~rhat although the
remedy to prevent a taking would bP. by injunction~ the
remedy for damages \vould be enforced as it is enforrbi
)n all other ra.ses against the state \vhere remedy is not
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spooifieally given by statute, to-wit, by resort to the
Board of Examiners. (78 P.2d, p. 513).

(4) Even though the Road Commission, or the Road
Comrnissioners individually, if acting within their authority are immune from suit, the Board of Examiners
is adequate remedy for a claim of consequential damages
and rneets the test of due process of law . The claim of
consequential damages is in the same class with all other
claims against the state and is governed by Section 13
of Article VII, Utah Constitution, regarding claims to
the Board of Exa1niners. (78 P.2d, p. 521).
In the Fourth District case the defendant was the
State Road Coinmission. The ruling of the Fourth Dis~
trict case allowing injunetive suit~ against individual
comtnissioners was dieta.. In the subsequent Hjorth
case this Court said the dicta of the Fourth District case
was not the true rule and proceeded to adopt the dissent
of T\l r. Chief Just ice "\Volfe, in the Fourth District case~
,\'. . e can 0111 y conclude, therefore, that the Hj orth case
overrated the dicta of the Fourth District case4
In support of this conclusion we quote the concurring
opinion of Chief Justice Wolfe in the Hj orth case:
'~I

concur. In m~r opinion this case overrules
State, by State Road Connn. v. District Court,
Fourth Judicial District, 94 LTtah 384, 78 P.2d
502, at least in it~ spirit and reasoning. '\Thilst
that case did not jnvolve a prayer for money
dan1ages for alleged consequential injury but was
an action to restrain the State Road Commission,
the ease proceeded on the theory that the R.oad
Co1nmission eould not be restrained but the cozn-
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missioners persona1ly could be restrained if they
threatened to da.mage a property owner conse-quentially and not by a direct taking, unless they
first paid for the consequential damages which
they would cause.

a long

and carefully considered dissent, I
registered opposition to tlris vj cw b ecanse it was
my theory that neither the Road Commission nor
the ind1vidual commissioners could be rest.rained
fro1n inflicting consequential damages, but only
from a direct taking without condenmation and
this on t.he theory that they would tl~e n be tre spa~sing and acting as individuals and "Without
legislative autho1·ity. In that opinion, the n1atter
of compenf.;ation by the legislature on approval of
a claim to the Board of Examiners as substantive
due process in all its ramifications ~"'as also rl1scns8ed at length. ~ >t: ~~~ (241 P.2d p . 910).
In

On page 28 of appcl1ant's hrief in this tnaiter, the
plaintiff argues tl1at there 1s no valid distinction betv{een
an injuT~ctivc su"it and an action for mandamus or declatory relief, and, therefore, since the Fourtl1 Dis t ri et cas P
authorizes an injunction against .Jndi"\o. . idnal comn'lissio ners, Inand an1 ns or der.Iaratory relief should he a vailable against jndividual eommissioners. Repeating that in
our opinion the Hjorth case overruled the Fourth District
case on this point, "\\'"e no'v adopt the plaintiff's line of
reasoning and argue that ~inec the individual e..Oulmissioncrs cannot be enjoin~d from consequential damages~ the} therefore, cannot be m3Jldarnused or ~ued for
declaratory relief.
7

,
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In applying the arguments of Justice Wolfe to the
present situation, we reason as follows:
(1) The Road Commissioners, if acting within their
authority are, as agents of the state~ immune from suit
and cannot be mandamused.
(2) That there is a fundamental difference between
a taking and a consequential damage, and that the Constitution guarantees only a substantive right and not a
procedural remedy as far as a consequential damage
is concerned.

(3) That the Board of J:Gxami.ners is an adequate
remedy and meets the requirements of due process of
law insofar as the r.laim of plaintiff in the instant situation. (And we note that b}' ~tatnte appeal can he made
from an unfavora.ble ruling of the Board of Exatniner8
to the Legislature. Sec. 63-6-17, lf. C.A. 1953) .
\\re cite as an overruling practical consideration the
prGblem wh·iclt, ]n our opinion, was the primary concern
of thi~ Court. ·in the Iljorth case; that i~. the

probletn in granting relief through judicial proceedings
to all persons \vho might be affected by road improveInentR. In arriving at its conclusion in the Hjorth case
that individual road commissioners need not respond
personally in consequential damage suitE=~ the Court
reasoned as follows:
(1) To hold other-wise, public officials would be
rearful to act at the risk of finding themselves personally
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liable for ·.acts in good faith in performance of their
duties. (241 P.2d pg. 909).

(2) If all the property to which any consequential
harmful effects had to be considered and the owners
joined as condemnees by the Road Commission, it would
be difficult, if not impossible, for the Cominission to
know whom they could safely omit from condemnation
proceedings. The 011ly safe way in which the commissioners could operate would be to join every proparty
owner abutting on or near the highway projeet in order
to avoid suits which would result in personal liability
to them . The impracticability of imposing such an obligation upon the public body in the construction and Inaintenance of our public highways is obvious. (241 P.2rl
pg. 909) .

.A.nd to these arguments may \Ve a.dd that if the
plaintiff should be suecessful in this utatter, the Road
Co1nrnissioner.s and the State of Utah would be subject
to mandamus by every propert~r o'Wller adjoining a
divided highv{ay in the State of Utah. This could, for
exarnplc~ IHean suits hy every property owner from
I~righam City to Springville.
As a more recent authority for our position in this
matter, we cite the case of ~-.9tate of "(Jtah ·v.J1'red Tedesco,
et al., 1955~ 286 P.2d 785, 4 TTtah 2d 31~ In this case
intervening defendants~ Bird and Evans, Inc. filed a
claim in a condemnation proceeding against property
adj oin.ing its property, alleging that its lru1 d would suffer
if the adjoining land was condemnedL This Court held
that. loss of an advantageous business relationship be-
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cause of the condemnation of adjoining property would
not support intervention in a condemnation suit~ and
that the defense of sovereign immunity was well taken
to this type of claim for consequential damage. This
Court then went on to say that:

deem it has be~
cau~e of damage gro-wing out of the condemnation
""W' hie.h is not asscrtible becau~e of :.-:;uch sovereign
immunity rnore properly may be asserted by
application to tt1e Board of Examiners under the

''Any clairn defendant

ma~y

provisions of Title 63~6-11 and 63-6-13, T~ . C.A.
1953,. for hearing and decision as to the merit of
the claim.'' (286 P .2d pg. 790).
Applying this ease to the inf.;tant situation it seems clear
to us that though the plaintiff might present a rJaim
for consequential damages to the Board of Examiners,
it cannot sue for eonseqnential damages nor force a
condemnation suit for the purpose of ascertaining a.nd
awarding such damages.
As to Point I, we sub1nit, therefore~ that the individual Road Co1nmissioners, when acting within the
scope of their authority in a skillful and proper manner,
are irnrnune from suit and c.annot he coercP.d by mandamus or other,vi~e into bringing a condemnation suit to
ascertain consequential dautages.
POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS F.AJLED TO STATE A CLAIM
AGAINST DEFENDANTS UPON WH]CH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED.

We argue first that the District Court did not err
proced u rail y in granting defend ants' Motion to Dismiss.
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We rcoognize arid adopt the rule cited by plaintiff in
his appeal brief to the effect that a cotnplajnt should
not be dismissed for insuf ficienc~y· unless it appears for
a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under
any state of facts which can be proved in support Gf the
elaim. (Brief of ...~ppellant, p. 9; Blackham v~ Snelgrove,
1955, 3 1~.2d 157, 280 P. 2d 453). In ascertaining with
"certa.intyH that plaintiff's cotnplrunt has no meritt the
Court n1a~y consider the absence of law as well as facts
to substantiate the claim. (2 lioores Fed Prac. 2nd Ed .
2244). The motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) perfornts substantially the same function as the o1d connn on
1a \\o~ general d e1n urre r. rr hough the well p1 eaded material
allegations of plaintiffts complaint are admitted by
defendants~ )fotion to Dismiss, conclusions of law or
unwarranted deductions of facts are not admitted. (2
I\{oores f.,ed. ·Prac., supra). rPherefore~ if as a matter of
la\v the District Court felt that plaintiff had no cause
of action, no matter what the plaintiff might later prove
in support of the factual allegations of hi8 complajnt,
then the District Court "\Vas justified in dismissing the
complaint on defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure
to state a cia int. The reoo rd doe~ not disclose the basis
upon ,vhich the Trial Court did disrniss plaintiff's eompJaint. J lo\vever:t on the haRi~ of defendants' Motion to
Dismiss (See R~ 4) we rnay assmne the eo1nplai n t was disIni~~ed either on the general ground of lack of jurisdiction
or the general ground of failure to state a claim, or on
both. If dismissed for failure to state a claim this could
have been J=.ecause the facts alleged were without merit or
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because as a matter of law the plaintiff was entitled to
no relief; and in deciding as a matter of la'v that plaintiff
had failed to state a clai.In, tlte District Court could
have based tllis decision on a preliminary decision of lack
of jurisdictionr (i1/iles v. Armstrong, C.A. 7th, 1953, 207
F . 2d 284, as abstracted at 2 Jtfoores 1~~ed. Prac., ~nd
I~~d. 1 1958 Supp., P~ 200)4
\V e subrnit that even admitting the well pleaded
material allegations of plaintiff's complaint, ( 1) plain tiff
ha~ failed to state a claim by rea..~on of the Court's lack
of juri~diction over the defendani.s 1 (2) plaintiff has
failed to state a claim by reason that the datnage claimed
is not eornpent:;able in a court of law. It: is a ''certaint).,.,
that plaintiff is entitled to no judicial re1i ef no matter
what state of facts he might be able to prove in support
of hi:-) -claim.

Having treated the jurisdiction proble1u lUlder
Point I above, we novl argue that the damage claimed
by plaintiff is not compensable in a court of la\v and that
for this reason th~ plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon 'vhich relief can be granted.

It is the position of defendants that by nature of
the police po1vers of the R·oad Commission as exercised
by the individual members thereof, it ma~r construct
the strips or islands of 'vhich plaintiff complains without
compensation for any re~ultnnt inconvenience or damage
to adjacent propert~~r o\vners . By Section 27-2-7, U.C.A.
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1953, the Road Commission is granted the follo-wing
powers:
,,,.,

:1

..

(2) To formulate and adopt rules and regulations for the expenditure of public funds for
th.e construction, improvement and maintenance
of state highways, and other purposes authorized
by la~r, and for letting contracts for any work
which the commission is authorized by law to do.

•••

(6) To make such rnles and regulations governing the use by the public of state roads as may
be necessary to provide for public safety and
against undue use of the state roads.
:1= •

*

(10) To adopt regulations in regard to
traffic on state roads, not in conflict "With law, and
to close state roads under constroetion. • • •
Further authority is granted. as follows:

The high,vay authorities of the state~ counties,.
cities and towns are authorizeo to so design any
limited-access facility and to so regulate, restrict,
or prohibit access as to best serve the traffic for
which such facility is intended; ~ • • In tl1is c.onnection such hlghway authorities are authorized
to divide and separate any limited-access facility
into separate roadways by the construction of
raised curbingst central dividing sections~ or other
physical separations~ or by designating such
separate roadways by signs, markers, stripes, and
the proper lane for su~_h traffjc by appropriate
signs,. markers, stripes, and other devices . • • •
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In the case of Zions Railroad and Light Corporation v .
Liftdsey, 211. Iowa 544, 231 N.W~ 461, it was held:
·~Primarily

the right to establish, regulate and
control highways rests in the state and it Inay
delegate such powers to board~, eommissions~ public or municipal corporations/'
We arc dealing here with the general problem of the
right of adjoining property owners to ar_.eess to public
highways. (See general digeu8sion 25 Am. Jur.~ Highways,
Sec. 154). We agree with plaintiff that. this ~'right of
access'' has been recognized in l~t.ah and would stipulate
that the Utah cases cited by plaintiff in his appeal brief
under Point II are authority for this position~ However,
with the modern advent of the "'limited access'" highway,.
it is necessary that 've carefully scrutinize the correct
proportions of this right. It has been ~tated:

'"The Hmited access highway has provided
one of the most effectivP. and popular means of at
least alleviating traffic problems. However, the
general recognition of the right of abutting property owners to an easement of ingress or egress
in high,vays bounding their property, com1nonly
called a J:right of ar_cess, ' has placed severe obstacles ln the way of the gro·wth. of sur.h highway
~ysterns, sinee the existence of such~ right gives
a high commercial value to property adjoining
heavily travelled roadways, and the expense of
condP-..mning suc-h rights greatly increases the already high cost of roadbuilding." (Annotation,
''Abutting Ovmers Right To Damages or their
Relief for Loss of Access Because of Lirnited
Access Highway or Street,'J 43 .ALR 2d. 1072).
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This right of aecc ~s it5 obvicusly not nnlimit ed. It
n1us t be reeonciled \Vi th the police po1vers of the state
to regulate and control public highways for the general
peace, safety and \Vel fare. A.nd it lli subordinate to th-e
public convenience, of \vhich tlle pub]ic authorities having
control of the streets are the j ndges, and is suhj ect to
such reasonable use of the street, not inconsistent with
it~ ntain ten a nee n;s a public high1vay, as ma~y be neces saiJ,.
for the public good and convenience and does not seriousl_y rJnpair it (24 A n1+ J ur., Pub. Higllw·ays, supra).
l.t is obvious that the courts ate at \\.. ide d-jvergence
as to \vhen and to \vhat extent eompensation should he
made for interference with this right of access. (See.
Annot.ation 43 ALR .2d, supra, and cases supplernental
thereto a11d note discu8sion, i'Just Coinpensat1on," H'enry
~1. Kaltenbaeh, a-402, pg·. 34). rpo bring all interference
no n1atter of 'vhat shade or degree, v.ithin the orbit of
condcinnation and compensation, \vould create the impossible liability feared by this Court as expressed in
I-Ijorth r_ase. (IIjorth v. \Vhittenburg, supr~) On the
other hand, as long as the courts continue to recognize
the right of access as a valuable property right, compensation ''lithin proper lin1i.tt5 and in the proper aetion
or proceeding must be made4 ~A..s long a:s the law in this
matter remains unsettled, each case whether viev~:ed by
the Court in a proper proceeding or by the Board of
~'JxaTniners in a proper proceeding, must be considered

separately.
Ho1vever, it is our opinion that this ·Court has established a rule and test that must guide us in tlte inRtant
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situation. In the case of Robinett -u. Price (1929), 74
l -tah 512, 280 P ac~ 736 1 the fact situation was alntost
identical to tlte fact ~ituatjon in our present ease~ The
plaintiff o"'~ed a piece of propert}·' on the south\\~est
corner of the intersection of lOth Street and an unnarned
high"\\,.a}r in PriPe. Utah. Becau~e of certain rail,vay tracks
ru u n i ng bet "veen the h igh\\.-a)· and ~VI ai n Street heyond
( ,vhi~h tracks as to inteTI\~renec eorrespond ex..aeti.J• with
the eUlJerett~ strips cornplaincd of in the instant ta~e)
Tenth Street "\vas closed as an acee8s street to ~iain 8t .
(This in effect is 1vhat has happened to 7th South Street
in our instant case; ire., by nature of the concrete islands
it is no longer possible to gain access to lf. Sr HighVt'ay 8991 from 7th So4 Rt.). Tenth Street running south from tl1e
high"Tay along the east line of plaintiff's property was
not closed or discontinued. (7th South Street running
east from :Main Street along the south line of plaintiff~s
property in the instant case has not been clo~ed or dis~
continued).. The high~Tay on "',.hich plain tiff'~ property
abutted on the south \Vas not closed or dit5continued .
(Main Street on which plaintiff~~ property abutts to the
east is not closed or discontinued in the instant case although traffic has been rerouted in one direction
thereon).. The highway on 1\'hieh plaintiff's property
abutted to the south afforded him ready ingress or
egress to and from the north boundary of l1is property.
(~{a in Street on which plain tiff'~ property abut t.s to the
east affords plaintiff in the instant case ready ingress
or egress to and from Main Street, so long as travelling
in a northward direction)+ The Court stated that what~
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on tite evidence, was claimed by plaintiff wa.s not that
ingress or egress to his property "\vas cut off by closing
Tenth Street, but that he was tllereby deprived of the
direct route whlch he theretofore had and enjoyed in
travelling from his property to the principal or main
portion of the city, v.'hich depreciated the value of his
property and greatly decreased the rental value of his
building rnaintained thereon. (280 P. pg 737). (What, by
the ·cornp1a int, plaintiff in. the instant ease cla.:i m s is not
that ingress or egress to his property has been cut off
by the concrete strips but that no'v though travel north~
ward from his _property has been unchanged; travel
south,vard rnust take a some-\vhat more circ.ui tous route,.
and ilirect access from Main Street to l~- S. Highway
89~91, 30 feet away,. bas been irnpeded).
In the Robinett case the eourt held that where
closing and discontinuance of a portion of the street
did not interfere 'vith property o\vner;..:; J means of egress
and ingress, but nlerel y d epr1ved h iln of direct route to
the main busine~s portion of the r~.It.y, depreciating prope~ty va]ue:.-:; BJid rendering rental more difficult, the
property owner had not sustained such a special loss
en titling hi rn to cornpensatio n.

The 1-tob"inett case suggest"s two tests: (1) the party
aggrieved must suffer some injury special in kind or
degree from the rest of the public, 1nore than mere
depreciation or loss of rental value~ ( 2) Egress or ingress
rnust be prevented or materially affected . (280 P. pg.
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737) The inconvenience and resultant loss of rental value
in the instant ease meets neither of these tests .
t

In support of defendants' position on this Point
and consistent with the tests of the Robinett case (supra),
we cite the follo-wing authority.

First, we refer the Court to certain related a11:d
general rules:
Highways officials are not personally liable for acts
done honestly in the exercise of the discretion which the
law gives them in constructing or maintaining a highway,
although their acts result in a trespass or damage to
an abutting property owner. (90 ALR 1482). In the
absence of fraud it js generally heJd that citizens or
taxpayers 'vho fail to show any such injury to them not
sustained by the general public, are not entitled to
complain of the rerouting or change of route or change
or removal of directional signs. (97 ALR 192) . Traffic
regulations which interfere with or restrict access to
and from abutting property are valid if they are reasonable and necessary for public convenience. (100 ALR 491)
It generally has been held that a property owner has no
right to compensation for diversion of traffic by the
relocation or rerouting of highways. (118 A LR 921)~
Since there are innumerable cases in this general
area, \Ve cite hereafter only more recent authority .
In the ease of Jluse v. J1ississippi ~9tate Highu,ay
Canunis.~ion 1 103 S. 2d 852, it was held that a highv,~ay
cormnission has the right to construct 1nedian Rtrip~ in
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four l~e high,vay 1vithout the payment of.compensation
to an abutting o\vner for damages resulting therefrom
c Vt!n t houglt eons tructi on re~ tri cts c. on den 1n ce' t:J right of
access to east or north- bound traffic lanes * s *.. rJ~he
O"'\ovner's inconvenience is one sha.red by general public as
incident to the proper exercise of police power~
(Note that the Constitution of the State of 1t:Iississippi
provides that private property shall not be taken or
danwgetl for publie use unless due comp~nsation is first.
rnade.)
In the case of (].araz:ella v. State, 269 \"\rise. 608a, 71
1\. \V'~ 2d 276, it \Vas held tl1at 'vhere an existing high,vay
is converted into a limited access highway but abutting
lando,vner'~ acccs~ to ordinary highvlay is merely made
rnorc circuitous, there is no taking of pre-existing easelnent of access and no compensation will be paid under
eminent domain.

In the cat:le of Sntick t\ (}rnnn~:on1J.~eaJt-h, 1954, l(y~ 268
S . V\T~2d 4~4~ jt \vas 1teld that 'vhere a side Rtreet upon
·which plaintiff's property fronted \Vas closed at one end
hy the construction of a througl1,vay, thus creating a.
cul-de-sac ~ituation., there \~·a~ no l'ig.ht of cornpensation.
In the case of ThonuJ..b' and JJ7 uruer Tn.r... t'~ Ci!ty of
1\-; eu~ Oorlea·n . -.·,
. J 956, J ~a~, 89 S~2d 885~ aeccss to plai nti rf 's
property \'-Tl~ ·impaired hy the rJosing of one street and
the Jo'". .ering of the grade of another street. It 1\...as held
that plaintiff v,cas not entitled to compensation since
traffic eould still reach the plaintiff~~ property h y a
n1ore circuitous route~ and that this ineonveniene.e 'vas
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suffered by the public in general. (Louisiana, incidentally,
is both "a taking and damage state.n)
In the case of UJ/n,q ley Shopping 0 e-nter v. State
Roads Co·m missivn) 193 7, 1:[d4 131 A. 2d 690~ a hi gh,vay
was reconstructed making it a divided four lane du.al
~lif!;hw·ay. A n1eilian strip divided north-bound and southbound lanes of traffic so that left turnR eould not be
rnade directly into plaintiff~s property and opposite
shopping c.enterft l\fotorists would have to turn at a
traffic 1ight or take a more circuitous route to reach
the shopping eenters. Property owners sued to enjoin
the State Road Commission frorn installing the rncdian
strip, maintaining that it amounted to a substantial
denial oi their rights of ingress and egress and a taking
of property without compensation. rrhe court found that
there was no such denial of aerRss as to conRtitute a
taking. It felt that the facts alleged made the case more
nearly akin to a diversion of traffie than to a blocking
of access to the high"\vay, and since the state could, if
it desired, divert traffic entirely a"\vay from the ~hopping
centers without being liable in damages, it eould e~~rtainly
and in the inte re~t of safety, interpose a11 ob~ta(·lc
making aceess le~6 ea::;:v. but 'vhieh '~·ould not aetually
destroy the arec~~~, and like~Nise not lH~ 1iahlc for da.ntagre~.

In the case of Rtnnelli ·u . City of l:vTPn~ Orleuns~ J 957~
La. 9G S. 2d 572~ a railroad overpass \\"as eonstrueted to
the east of plain tiff's p ropert}'" -v.,•hie,h con1pletely b l oeked
hiH acce8s to an .adjoining street. In order to rea.eh l5aid
street he had to travel an extra 3000 feet. The Sup-reme
Court approved the action of the Trial Court in refusing
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to allow an)"" damages ~,hatsoever, and

stated that it
had repeatedly held that under the police power a city
rnay divert traffic without subjecting itself to liability,

and that any damages suffered were general rather than
special.
In the case of Oklahoma Turnp;ke Authority v.
Chandler, 1957, Okla. 316 P.2d 828, it 'vas held that as
a general prOJ)Osition a property owner may reeover
com pensatj on for losR of access only if he can sho"lh~ that
the closing of the road has especially damaged him as
distinguished from general damages to the con1munity~
The darnages Inust be different in kind, not merely in
degree. 1"he lando,vner must suffer more than mere
inconvenience. ( Oklaho1na, incidentally, is both ~~a taking
and damage state~' ')

In the case of State IJ.igkway Department v~ Strick~
land, 1958, Ga. 102 S.E42d 3, Strickland and others sought
an injunction against the State Highway Depart1nent
to restrain it from the constructing a curb 16 feet from
their property and 22 feet from the center of lf. S.
Highway 3414 Strickland operated a wholesale 1neat
packing plant on hjs tract 'vhich abutted the highway,
and for many years large trucks had been in the hab1t
of backing up to a loading and unloading platform
connected 'vith this plant. The proposed curbing made
this operation irnpossible although there were two 30
foot driveways whirll Strickland could use after the
curbing ,,,.as in~talled. The Suprente Court held that the
installation 'vas a proper traffic control device and did
not involve an appropriation of any of the property or
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a trespaf.;~ thereon. In the course of its holding, it said
that abutting property owners are not entitled as against
the public to access to their ]and at all points in the
boundary between it. and the highway 80 long as they
are still afforded a convenient acces.s to their property.
ln the case of City ServiJce Oil ()ompany v~ City of
N eu} Y ark, 1958, }; . Y~ 154 N ~E.2d 814, C~ i ty Service Oil
Co1npany sought injunctive relief and damages because
of the establjshinent of bus stops on a corner where one
of its gasoline stations v.ras located. TheN e"\\~ York Court
or Appeals ruled that the eompany~s claim that the right
of .ingress and egress is a paramount property right
was erroneous~ It said that on the contrary, it is the right
of t.he public to the use
the streets~ which is absolutr.
and paran1ount. It affirmed the action of the ·Trial Court
in denying the claim, stating that a mun1eipa11ty may
regulate and conrtol trafric, and unless such regulation
is arbi trar_y· and ca pri ciou s,. it \\.111 not be res trained
although the abutting ov?ners may be inconvenienced by
such regulation.

or

To dis tingni sh the cases cited b~y plain tiff 1,ve first
point out that the defendant in the case of Duuly .Block
et al D. k9alt L-ake Rapid Transit Company (.li.ppellant's
brief, pg. 9) ease was a private corporation and not the
State of Utah, its agents, or an agency thereof~ The
interesting thing about the Dooly caset however, which
apparently plain tiff failed to note:- is that although the
~-ourt recognized the right of access, light and air. it holds
that a znunicipal corporation when empowered by t.he
l Jeg islature, may devote a reasonable portion of a f.; tree t
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to the use of a street railv.ray 1\rithout compensation to
abutting O\vnerR ; only \Vh en the entire width of the street,
or at least ~o mueh as to render ordinar~y traffic "impossiblet js devoted to railroad purpo~es is the interference
unla,vful. The conrt indicated that another railroad track
along 2nd So. St., in addition to track.s already in placet
\VDuld be unneeessaryr This case stands for nothing more
titan that \vhen interference 1\--i.tlt egre~8 or ingress i8 unn eeessa ry ~ and total or matcri al, s ueh ir1.te rference .i ~ unla\ovful.. rrhe eourt also ~tated, 1nc.idental1y, thai an abutting o'vnPr may 1nake any and all proper use of the street~
sub jer.t to proper and reasona. ble municipal control and
police regulation:5. It is also interesting to note the foJlo\viiig language of the court:
rphe right of

to grant
franchisPs to private corporations for the construction and operation of street railways, when
einpo\ver·ed by the legislature so to do, is not now,
it seems, an open question, although streets were
originally not designed for that purpose, but \vere
rnostly eonfin.cd to the right of public travel in
the ordinary· mode~. Enlightened public policy,
advanced civilization~ and a desire to subserve
publjc intere8t, have induced courts to become
more lax in the enforcf'..mPnt of strict technical
rules and principles in this regard, and it appears
no\v to be o,vell settled by judicial authority that
a reasonable portion of a street may be devoted
for the purposes of a street railway, and that
such is a proper use of the t:1treet/' (33 P . pg. 232)
"'

1it

1ft!;

"(;,):

lllllil iei palitiPs

It would seetn that enJightened public policy, advanced
civilization and a desire to subserve pub lie interest
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should no\v recognize the rea son able and skillfu] use o.f
divided high\vays.

The case of Morris v. Oregon Sho-rt LineR . Company
(Appellanf~ brief, p._ 10) also ma~y· be diBtinguiRhed by
the nature of the partiP.s involved. rt should also he noted
that the "I\·1 orris case \\··as COln•nellCed ¥rh.en th-e defendant
cotnmenced construction of tvfo additional tracks in front
of the plaintiff's property. The court stated:
''No dan1ages are

c]ain~ed b.\~ reHHon

ot the
laying and the operation of trains over the first
two tracks. ~...either is there any ciaitn tnade that
the appellant did not have the legal right to lay
said tracks~ or to operate its trains over them in
the street afore~aid/' (102 P., p . G30) .
The evidence \vas that the additional tracks "\Vonld greatly
impede egress and ingress. (T,vo~ three or more dividing
strips rnight be illlreason able and greatly irnpede plaintiff's ingress or egresR. The concrete strips as presently
existing 1vould appear only a reasonable exercise of the
pol iee power of the stat e.) The court 1rvas also careful to
stipulate that an o'vner of property, \Vhich abutt~ on a
public street, ltacl such a property right that he rnay
recover from interference with sueh tight., only in a
prope.,. action~
Without going into detail we note that in the eru;e of
State by State Ro:ad Commissi·an v. Ro.::-:elle, et ·ux~, (Appellant ~s brief, p . 11) the Court talks about unreasonably
cutting off access.. No unreasonable cutting off i~ alleged
by plaintiff in the present case.
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In the case of Boskovich 1: .. M~dvale C~ty CorporatWtt,
(Appellant's brief, p. 11) the court it self distinguished
said case from tlte Robinett case (supra) on the grounds
that the Boskovich ease involves a duly platted subdivision containing streets and alleysr This eireumstance,
of course 7 suggests new and different legal concepts and
makes the case, we believe, inapplicable to the present
situation.

After distinguishing the 1Jtah eases cited by plaintiff and under the test of the Rrobinett case as supported
by the other authorities cited ahove 7 we submit that the
insta.n t situation is not one of either a taking or an interferenee sufficient to warrant cornpensati.on. The plaintiff
I
has suffered no injury special in kind or degree from
the rest of the public more than mere depreciation or
loss of rental valuer and fron1 tlle facts as alleged, egress
or ingress has not been prevented or materially affected.
The instant situation falls simply withln the reasonable,
ski IIiul and competent exercise of t 11 e police power of
the state in regulating highvray~ and the traffic thereon
for the public welfare.
A t5 to tl1e propriety of the use of mandamus in this

type of si tua ti on,. ";-c are satisfied to repeat plaintiff's
argument that there i8 no valid di~tinction between au
injunctive suit, as brought in the 'fl~ourth District case,
and an action for mandamus or declaratory relief. This
being true, it. follo'\vs that if an injunction will not lie,
:then 1nandamns \vi1l not lie. Ho\vever, 've further argue
that there are three manrlatory elements of a mandamus
action: (1) a clear, unquestionable right to mandan1us in
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the parties seeking same; (2) a clear legal duty to act
on the part of the party to whom the writ is directed;
(3) absence of any other remedy at law. (See 55 C.t'J.S.,
Mandamus, Sec. 51). None of these elements are met
in the instant situation. In connection wi.th (3) it has
been held that 'vhere an administrative remedy is available, it must be exhausted before mandanius \vill lie4
(Reardon v. Daly City, 1945 Cal.,. 163 P. 2d 462) .

In the case of Ho ftm-am.. v.

Lewis~

Judge, 31 TJtah
179 1 87 P. 167, 170, 1906, this Court stated:
''But even in the case of mandate the legal
right to require the person or court to proceed,
and the legal duty to do so must be free from
doubt ; otherwise even this remedy must be denied/'" (87 P.,. p . 170).

In the case of Board of Educafi'(Jn of Ogden v. Anderson, 93 T~tah 522, 74 P. 2d 681, 1937, this Court held
that:
"Wltere the writ [of mandamus] is sought to
coin pel action on the part of the cou1t [ o-ffi eer or
tribunal] the legal right to t.he partieular action
which is sought to be compelled by the writ must be
clear and the legal duty to do the act or thing
demanded~ 4 • must be equally clea1·4'' (74 P. 2d,
p. 683).
In

general~

as to mandamus,. it has been

stated~

'' A·1 andamus is a remedy at law employed to

compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use..''
(34 Am. Jur . , Mandamus, Sec.. 4, and cases cited)4
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~ Rer ltedy i~

in person run to enforce the obligation of th.c individual to "\vhom addressed ~ it does
not reach the office nor can it be directed to the

office.''

( 3 4 A rn ~ J'J ur., lvl an dam us, Sec. 7, and cases (~ i ted)~
'"'llhe immunity of a state prevents nlandamus
against a public officer_, board or comm.1sf.;ion
where it is in .reality a proceeding against the sovereign.. ''
(34 Am~ ~Jur . , hfandronus~ Sec.123, and cases cited).
An instructive diseu~sion of v, hen and when not an
action against a public otficial is a Ruit against the state
is had in Pen-noye1~ L~r L~i cC onnattghy, 140 lT .S. 1, ll S. Ct
699, 35 L. Eel 363.. It is there said:
7

~"The

fin:;t el~s i~ \\'l1cre the su1t is brought

against tltc officers of the state, as representing
the state's action and liability, tltus ntaking it~
thou g11 not a party to the reeo rd, the real party,
against \Vhich the judgment "Will so operate as
to compel it to specifically perforrn its eontraets.''
In our opinion tl1c legal right of tl1e plaintiff to
compel a condemnation suit i::::. not clear and unquestionable, nor is there any clear legal duty under the facts
as alleged on the part of the Road Commissioners to
eoinn1enee a eoru.lt~nn~aiion suit. \V·e find nothlng in our
En1incnt Dorna.in statute Cl,itle 78~ Chapter 3±~ TTJJ.A.
1953) that clearly eornpels a condemnation suit for consequential damage. Nothing in the mandatoijT cotnplaint
form s ecrns to eonternplate such a situation. (Sec~ 78-34-6,
r_;+c.A. 1953).. In faet~ as argued above, no such duty

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31
does exist in the case of a consequential damage resulting
from legitimate use of the police power in regulating and
maintaining public. h.lghv,~ay~. 'Phat the defendant ha~
an adequatl~ reinedy through the Board of Exanriner8
has been eon·vincingly argued by Chief ,Justice ·\v· olfe~
and seemEi=t to be the rule of the Iljorth case, not\Vithstanding plain tiff~ s argument to the eon trary. .And it is
obvious that a n1andan1ns act. ion agai uHt the individual
Road Commissioners for the purpo~c of eo•npcHi.ng a
condernnat.ion suit is j u reall ty a proeeedir1g- aga1n~t. the
+

sovere1gn~

~,or

these reasonH it
not a prO}.lCr p-r·oceeding.

seen•~

to

u~

that

Inandarnu~

•s

"\Y- e repeat that ~A7 e do not kno'v on 'vhat grounds tl1e
District ·Court disrnissed plaintiff's complaint. By virtue
of the ground8 for dismi~salset out in defendant~~ rnotion
to dis-rniss~ \YC (Jan as~urne the rornplaint "'~as dislnisscd
fol' either laek of ,juri Hdietion or for i"ai]ure 1u state a
clain1. A.ssurning tlLe Di ~triet Court. dcei sion \\'HS based
on ei t.h er ~round, '~le rec l p la Inti ff'~ argo. rn en ts r-cgard.!Ilg
manrlanl LIS and deelarat.or.v judgn1ent. are prPnlature, nnnecessar_y· and iinntatcrial to a ruling on this appeaL But
in anfnver to pla1nt1:ftjs argument regarding d~(:larat.ory
judgments, \\·e rc·fer the (~onrt. t.o Sr~~~ ion 7S-;~a-ti~ i_~ .C.2\...
1953~ , ..·hieh provides as !\lllO\v~:

HThe court rnav
.... refuse to render or enter a
declaratory judgrnent or decree 'vhere such judgment or uccrec, -If rende-red or entered, 1vouid not
te rrninate the uncertainty or con trove rs y giving
ri~e to the proceeding.~'
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Even assu~ting the District Court decided as prayed
-f o r by plain tiff that the ·impeding of egress and ingress
1~ a.'. q.am~ge: to )\thich plaintiff is constitutionally entitled
t_o comp~nsation, and that defendants have a duty to initiate eminent domain proceedings for that purpose, 'vonld
suclt a finding terminate the uncertainty or controversy
giving rise to the proceeding1 \Vhat about the problem of
juri sdi ct ion over the individual commissioners I Even assuming the conclusion of law argued by plai;ntiff, has
plaintiff stated a claim in his complaint four-square mth~
in such conclusion?
Certainly~ '\Ve

feel that the District Court could have felt,
with strong reason, that a declaratory statement regarding· egre:.-::.s and ingress would not terminate the ''uneer~
tainty or eontroversy giving rise to the proceedlng.n It
was well "Withln the discretion of the Court to refll8e a
declaratory· judginent.

CONCijUSION

Bither on thP. ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person or on the gro~nd of failure to state a claim
upon 'vhicl1 relief can be granted it was proper for the
District Court to di sntiss plaintiff's com plaint.

As
to .lack of jurisdiction, defendants submit ~
.
1. By v~rtu~ of the pri1ne authority of the Fourth
District case ..the District Court has no jurisdiction over
the defendants collectively as members of the State Road
Commission.
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2. By virtue of the dissenting opinion of Chief Jnstice Wolfe in the Fourth District case as adopted by this
Court in the subsequent Hjorth case~ and other authority,.
the District Court has no jurisdiction over the defendants
as inilividual commissioners.
As to the plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be grante~ defendants submit:
1.. The District Court did not err in· dismissing the
complaint for as a matter of law the plaintiff failed to
state a claim regardless of what facts plaintiff might
prove in support of hls claim.

2. The erection of rnedian strips on a public highway in a skillful and reasonab1e manner for the regulation of traffic and to provide for public safety is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.

3. Plaintiff has alleged no injury special in kind or
degree fron1 the rest of the public, nor that egress or
ingress has been prevented or materially affected .
We also submit that neither mandamus nor declaratory judgment are proper remedies in this case1 though,
in our opinion, a decision as to these matters is unnecessary to a. ruling on this appeal.
We finish by asking: if the commissioners ''condemn~"
the plaintiff's right of access, a consequential damage is
found and an award made, how many others having an
alleged right of access should be joined in eminent domain
proceedings t In the words of this Court in the Hjortb
case:
''We hold that where consequential injury to
property arises out of the faithful and honest per(
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forma.nee of duties imposed by law upon members
of the Ro~ Conunission, $llch officials are not
required to respond personally. The argument of
plaintiffs' . eo.unsel against the injustice to his

clients of sovereign i1nmunity is eloquent and
persuasive. The remedy is not to be found in
imposing an unreasonable ~nd arbitrary burden
upon these public officials. Thls phase of our law
is well established and of long standing. If it is
to be changed, that must come through the sovereign power of this cormnon·vlealth, the people,
speaking through
legislature."

the

Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDG~~
Attorney General
FRANKLYN B. MATHESON
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondents
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